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INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, Brandon Afoa was a ramp agent at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA-
TAC) Airport in Seattle. Afoa was involved in a catastrophic collision when the brakes and 
steering of his aircraft tow truck failed and collided with a broken luggage lift that crushed him 
(Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 2015). The flight-line worker sustained severe injuries to his spine and 
was partially paralyzed and lost use of his legs and his right arm. Afoa’s injuries require him to 
have medical professional care on a daily rotation.  
In 2011, Afoa filed a lawsuit against the Port of Seattle in King County Superior Court, 
alleging that the Port failed to maintain safe premises and violated common law and statutory 
duties to maintain a safe workplace (Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 2015). The Port of Seattle legal 
defense argued that because Afoa was an employee of a private company contracted to the 
airlines and not the airport authority, that in this case that they were not the liable party for the 
Afoa’s injuries. (Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 2015).  
On March 31, 2015, a King County jury returned a verdict of $40 million dollars. The 
judge cited that the airport has a duty to provide a safe working environment for all workers 
including contractors and third-party entities operating at the airport (Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 
2015). Shortly after the accident, SEA-TAC became one of the first FAA pilot airports to 
research and implement a SMS plan (ACRP, 2007) The SEA-TAC bodily injury case highlights 
some key reasons on why a safety management system (SMS) is necessary in modern business 
environments like an airport.   
Most airports are like SEA-TAC in the respect that they have government employees as 
well as private third-party vendor employees working within close proximity. As the evidence in 
this case clearly demonstrates, there were a multitude of hazards that were not identified on the 
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airfield. Both the heavy machine tow was defective and should have not been operational and the 
broken baggage rack was also a hazard. A strong safety culture may have prevented this accident 
from occurring and may have prevented Afoa from sustaining such debilitating injuries. SEA-
TAC Airport no doubt would have been spared the negative media attention, financial and legal 
resources, and time spent on this accident if there was a strong safety culture at that time.  
One of the growing trends in aviation is the development, implementation and 
maintenance of safety management systems (SMS). The conceptual framework of SMS research 
in the commercial aviation industry has become more prevalent in the past decade, has after they 
proved successful in use by the military and other high-risk industries. Safety Management 
Systems has been implemented in several other industries such as manufacturing (Cooper and 
Phillips, 2004), nuclear energy sites (Aerosafe Risk Management, 2010), railroad transport 
(DOT, 2007), and chemical processing plants (Hoffman and Stetzer, 1996).  
The main purpose of SMS is to eliminate aircraft accidents or serious incidents (ICAO, 
pg. 2-1, 2013). While elimination of all incidents is the ultimate goal, it is not possible for an 
airport to be completely free of hazards and risk (Reason, 1997). Insuring that safety risks are 
constantly mitigated is challenging task in the transportation industry. However, SMS is a 
continuous streamlined process that can greatly improve the safety performance of an 
organization (Reason, 1990).  
Occupational risks occur from both airport personnel as well as the equipment that 
personnel operate in daily operations. The main concept of SMS is to minimize risks to 
acceptable levels. The purpose of this paper is to (1) briefly synthesize modern literature on 
safety culture, (2) review common leadership theories and demonstrate its application for safety 
coordinators, (3) To make recommendations and give practical strategies on building  strong 
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safety cultures in airports.  One of the gaps in safety and human factors research is how do 
airport administrators build and maintain a culture of safety with limited resources or limited 
experience with SMS implementation?  Developing and maintaining a culture of safety is key 
to having all members of an organization take ownership and to actively engage daily tasks 
with safety as a core value. This manual addresses the key elements of SMS and draws upon 
leadership and management strategies for airport managers to build and improve a safety 
culture within an airport organization. 
One of the key factors of SMS culture requires that there is a communal involvement and 
a visible commitment from airport management to promote safety in the daily activities 
throughout an airport. Due to the dynamic concepts involving SMS, all airport personnel must 
value safety regardless of experience, title, or seniority. Since airports are a public utility, there 
is a duty of care by all aviation administrators to be knowledgeable and adept at managing their 
airports as safely and efficiently as possible.  
One of the gaps in safety research is the significance of the leadership role in building a 
quality culture of safety. Building a culture of safety is important in facilitating a successful 
safety management system. Culture plays a significant role in all of the components of SMS 
especially in the safety risk management and safety assurance phases of the SMS process 
(Stolzer et al., 2011). This manual is designed to provide the Accountable Executive and other 
airport stakeholders in charge of safety operations with a reference guide to aid in successfully 
implementing, building, and sustaining a robust safety culture and environment.  
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CHAPTER 1 
DEFINING SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Safety Management Systems (SMS) are formalized, proactive and collective approaches 
toward managing safety risks (IACO, 2013). SMS includes systematic procedures, practices, 
and policies for the management of safety (IACO, 2013). SMS has been used by a variety of 
different public and private sector industries such as chemical manufacturers, petroleum, 
nuclear facilities, railroad, and medical institutions (ACRP, Report 1, Pp. 12-17, 2007).  
In the context of aviation, safety is actively mitigating against property damage or bodily 
injury within an airport by designing metrics and benchmarks through continual data collection 
and evaluation. The goal of safety management systems is to reduce or maintain risks to an 
acceptable level within an airport (IACO, 2013).   
While elimination of all incidents is the ultimate goal, it is not possible for an airport to 
be completely free of hazards and risks. Human error will always be present in any 
environment, especially in an airport environment with planes, motor vehicles and people all 
moving at a consistently rapid tempo (Reason, 1997). 
The SMS process includes four components; Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, 
Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. It is important to remember that the four components 
are relational and flow together as a process (ACRP, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
If a single component is omitted or neglected this may result in the overall SMS plan not 
properly mitigating risk. SMS does not develop in an immediate fashion. SMS is a process that 
requires commitment from the leadership, active participation from organizational members, and 
time (Stolzer et al., 2011). Airport management must be unilaterally on-board or the SMS 
process will not work. Commitment should be clearly articulated in the safety policy and in the 
safety information disseminated for safety promotion (FAA, 2015). The process of data 
collection expanded beyond reviewing only accidents or incidents and attempting to mitigate 
risks proactively. These principles are demonstrated in the SMS model and they reinforce the 
emphasis that continuous data collection and analysis to identify hazards and risks are necessary 
to having a functional SMS plan. 
SMS stresses the importance of communication and creating an environment that 
positively fosters safe behavior rather than creating an environment of fear. Once SMS is 
gradually implemented into an organization, safety becomes a fundamental value of the 
organization and will significantly improve the performance of the airport (IACO, 2013).  
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Implementing SMS and leading a strong safety culture is a challenging task. At first, the 
idea of implementing SMS may be received with skepticism or negatively by airport employees. 
Airports that have management, employees, and staff that have worked there for a long duration 
of time may demonstrate a resistance to something that is new and unknown.  This is what makes 
the initial phases of the SMS implementation so critical to the long-term safety performance. 
Airport leadership must actively engage employees and promote safety, while at the same time 
understanding the concerns of the employees. Admiral Thad Allen, Former Commandant of the 
Coast Guard once said “Change is hard, but not as hard as recovering from a missed opportunity 
or loss of confidence that comes when leaders fail to act.” (Coast Guard, 2007) 
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CHAPTER 2 
BRIEF HISTORY OF AVIATION SAFETY 
The evolution of aviation safety has three distinct eras starting in the early 1900’s. The 
first era is called the technical era and refers to aviation safety from the early days of aviation to 
the late 1950’s (IACO, 2013). As aviation quickly became part of the United States 
transportation infrastructure and significant as a social utility, safety was viewed in terms of 
mechanical or technological factors (IACO, 2013).  
      
 
Figure 2.  Evolution of Aviation Safety 
Accident investigations often concluded that aircraft mechanical failure was the root 
cause of the accident and mitigation strategies focused on engineering and improving the design 
and maintenance of aircraft (Reason, 1990). World War II was the catalyst for many of the 
modern technological improvements that overall impacted and improved safety within aviation. 
Aerospace technology research and development significantly improved by the 1950’s 
and there was a decline of aircraft incidents through new transportation legislation passed by 
Congress during the 1950’s and 1960’s. The U.S. Air Force began developing ‘safety systems’ 
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as a strategy to preserve resources and to maximize combat capability (Air Force Safety 
Handbook, 2000). During the 1950’s the Air Force cited 10 aircraft incidents per 100,000 flight 
hours (Air Force Safety Systems Handbook, 2000). After the U.S. Air Force implemented safety 
systems, safety performance improved significantly to less than 2 aircraft incidents per 100,000 
in the 1980’s (Air Force Safety Systems Handbook, 2000).  
The U.S. Air Force invested time and money into a branch-wide comprehensive safety 
plan because it was method to decrease the massive costs associated with aircraft incidents as 
well as loss of combat ready resources (Air Force Safety Systems Handbook, 2000).  Essentially, 
it is too expensive not to have a plan of safety. This should be the main goal of any organization 
to preserve resources and protect valuable personnel from damages. 
The Air Force safety systems program has saved billions in taxpayer money since the 
implementation of the branch-wide safety systems. This early example of SMS implementation 
by the U.S. Air Force presents a good example regarding why the implementation of a safety 
system is important to preserving fiscal resources and can aid in lower costs associated to paying 
out claims for damages caused by incidents in general aviation. 
The second era, the human factors era is the investigative perspective that aircraft and 
airport incidents may be caused due to variables beyond technological failures. The regulatory 
framework being developed through legislation proved to have a positive impact on aviation 
safety. As aviation grew to be a more viable mode of long-distance transportation and it became 
a significant part of the larger transportation industry.  
Although aircraft incidents decreased by the 1970’s, aviation investigations determined 
that human error was commonly cited as one of the causes of aviation accidents. However, the 
scope of the Human Factors Era, was limited to the accident and the individual. This perspective 
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erroneously separates the investigation of the individual and larger organizational framework. 
The idea that airports are complex social structures and the behaviors of individuals are related to 
the organization was overlooked until the early 1990’s (Zohar, 2010).  
The organizational era is the modern perspective of aviation safety staring from the early 
1990’s to present day. The organizational era began to view aviation accidents as a multi-faceted 
issue that is more complex. Investigations began to take into account variables other than just the 
technological factors, human error, but also the organizational structure in which the accident 
happened.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SAFETY CULTURE 
While the terms safety culture and safety climate are used interchangeably, their 
meanings differ slightly. Safety culture references patterns of behavior (safe or unsafe), core 
beliefs and behaviors. Safety climate refers to the current perceptions employees have of safety 
in the airport. To achieve the best possible outcomes of improving the culture of safety from the 
SMS plan, safety values must be clearly articulated through the general core values within an 
organization.  
Safety culture defines what the values, beliefs, and behavior individual exhibit in daily 
activities (Reason, 1997). Culture is one of the most important foundations to safety management 
systems that is commonly overlooked in the technical application of SMS. Culture is important 
when discussing SMS because the root cause of accidents was historically tied deficiency in an 
organization of safety culture (Reason, 1997). 
The foundation of safety culture must start from the top of the organizational scale. 
Senior airport management is paramount in actively participating and communicating the core 
safety values (Manuele, 2013). Dr. Robert Helmreich and Ashleigh Merritt (2001) research 
determined that the ‘culture of a profession’ is stemmed from a sense of community and social 
bonds of a common identity. Most importantly, the norms and values of the organization are 
demonstrated daily by the senior members of the organization and then indoctrinated down to the 
new recruits (Helmriech and Merritt, 2001).  
While there is no unanimous definition of safety or culture in the aviation community, 
there are some common elements identified (see Figure). The IACO Safety Management Manual 
defines safety as; 
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“Safety is the state in which the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced 
to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard 
identification and risk management” (IACO, 2013) 
Safety management scholar Fred Manuele provides a good definition to understand 
culture. Manuele defines culture as;  
“An organization’s culture consists of its values, beliefs, legends, rituals, mission, goals, 
performance measures, and a sense of responsibility to its employees, customers, and 
community” (Manuele, 2013)  
Human factors scholar James Reason provides five detailed components of a safety culture. In 
the first component, Reason posits that every safety management system is reliant on the active 
participation of the members of the organization to report hazards or incidents. Everyday airport 
employees may be subject to a variety of different hazards and in order for SMS to be successful, 
all employees must feel comfortable reporting hazards, accidents or incidents that may have 
occurred without fear of blame or disciplinary action (Reason, 1997, pg. 195).  
                
 
Figure 3.  Safety Culture Model – James Reason (1997) 
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Airport management must design reporting procedures that insure the confidentiality of 
the employee or patron submitting a report will be maintained. Secondly, it is also important that 
the information being provided about an incident will be evaluated and acted upon. Since SMS is 
data-driven, having a confidential hazard reporting system is imperative to the success of SMS. 
 The actions of management are important take after a hazard report has been submitted. 
Employees that do not see any action from management after submitting an incident or hazard 
report, may conclude over time that there is no purpose or reason to report incidents and general 
participation will decline. Additionally, if employees feel that they may be punished for ‘telling’ 
on themselves or co-workers about an incident will not participate in hazard reporting.  
A safety management system is most efficient when there is data and information about 
incidents happening throughout the SMS processes. Since hazards and risks are constantly 
changing, having employees submit an incident report is invaluable to the continuous process of 
SMS and to mitigate against new hazards in a timely manner. 
The second component of SMS culture that is closely tied to the reporting culture 
component is informed culture. An informed culture means that the safety coordinator is 
collecting and reviewing safety incidents or hazard reports. Most importantly, the SMS 
coordinator has the responsibility to keep the entire organization informed on safety issues on a 
consistent basis (Reason, 1997, pg. 195).  
For an example, if there were numerous reports submitted to the SMS coordinator about 
specific hazard and that information is not communicated throughout the organization - the 
probability that a preventable incident may occur increases. However, if information about that 
hazard is clearly communicated throughout the organization, then all employees can benefit from 
that safety announcement of that hazard and can modify their behavior to prevent an incident 
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from happening. Safety coordinators that can demonstrate a commitment to keeping their 
organization constantly informed about safety issues will generate more individual participation 
in the SMS process. 
As previously mentioned in reporting culture, the safety coordinator must develop an 
environment of trust so that employees are encouraged and comfortable in providing information 
about safety issues. One strategy that can help with creating an atmosphere of a just culture is the 
standard that reporting unsafe actions will not result in disciplinary action if the error was 
unintentional (Reason, 1997, pg. 195). One management strategy that creates confidence and 
trust is designing a reward system that provides positive reinforcement for those that do report 
safety issues through the proper channels.  
Airport management must use reasonable judgment when assessing safety errors or 
unsafe acts. Employees who act recklessly or assume unnecessary risks should face disciplinary 
consequences if the facts of the incident clearly determine error was not unintentional (Reason, 
1997, pg. 195). Airport managers may find unique challenges in assessing appropriate 
disciplinary actions when they implementing a new SMS program.  
One strategy that can help safety coordinators develop a just culture is to have an 
incremental disciplinary process that may start with a verbal warning and clearly communicating 
to the employee on why their actions were erroneous and provide constructive feedback to avoid 
problems in the future.  
An incremental disciplinary process starting with a verbal warning is optimal to building 
an environment of trust and insuring that other employees will not be fearful of a written 
disciplinary action that may have adverse effects on their performance reviews.  Airports that are 
implementing a SMS program in their organization for the first time or making significant 
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changes to their old SMS plan, that it may take time for the culture of safety to mature. Airport 
management that can establish confidence and trust from the start of the SMS implementation 
will see more participation from their employees. 
According to James Reason (1997), a flexible culture involves an organization ‘shifting’ 
from a standard hierarchical mode to a flatter professional mode. For an example, during a crisis, 
the organization will rely upon the task experts to adapt to the circumstances and find solutions 
to the crises. This requires that the organization trust, respect, and train members so in the event 
of a crisis or major change in the daily operations everyone can still perform within their roles. 
One way that airports can achieve a flexible culture is by investing in emergency training and 
conducting hands-on simulations that replicate crisis situations. This subcomponent of safety 
culture ties directly to the safety promotion phase of SMS and will pay dividends in the event of 
a crisis. 
A learning culture means that an airport is able to identify and learn from their mistakes. 
If the SMS process is being constantly assessed and monitored through the use of data and 
information, this should be disseminated to employees through regular safety promotion 
(Reason, 1997). Dr. James Reason concludes that administrators must be competent to make the 
right decision using safety information provided through SMS. Most importantly is that there 
must be a willingness to implement organizational reforms based upon risks or issues presented 
(Reason, 1997, pg. 196). 
The main focus of SMS should not be solely the financial costs involved with 
implementing a plan. Business decisions always are tied to how much capital is available and 
the effects that the decision has on revenue. Transforming an organization’s safety culture also 
means that the Accountable Executive and SMS coordinator must show evidence that 
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investment in safety is worthwhile from a business and financial decision-making perspective 
(Stolzer et al., 2011). 
 Safety is part of business and there is a cost to doing business. Unfortunately, safety is 
often viewed as a necessary evil that needs to be there, but at the same time safety takes away 
funds from other projects at the airport (Stolzer et al., 2011). Safety administrators should be 
aware that a strong safety culture will help mitigate against hazards and prevent accidents, 
however this sometimes is hard to prove. Typically, an airport with zero accidents cannot 
directly correlate the safety culture to the accident rate, but if there is an accident, the 
subsequent investigation can prove that there was a poor safety culture that caused the accident 
(Stolzer et al., 2011).   
The Seattle-Tacoma International Airport accident is a clear example of the possible 
consequences stemming from a poor safety culture. It is viable to account for the total amount 
of losses attributed to the medical and worker compensation claims, attorney and legal fees, and 
the final jury verdict that weighed in at $40 million from the accident. From a business 
perspective, the purpose of maximizing revenue and minimizing losses includes those losses 
paid out for property damage, bodily injury claims, worker compensation cases, lawsuits, or 
governmental fines. However, some airport administrators fail to understand the importance of 
loss minimization as it applies directly to financial planning and maximizing revenue (Stolzer 
et al., 2011).  
Siehn (2008) provides a variety of examples of cos that an airport many incur due an 
accident. First, direct costs are expenses similar to those aforementioned losses such as 
payments worker compensation claims, site clean-p, damages to property or other facilities. 
Secondly, there are indirect costs associated with an accident as well. Indirect costs could be 
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the loss of revenue from a client or customer due to suspended service, loss of revenue from 
sales, poor public relations, human capital investment (rehiring or retraining due an accident).  
Although these lists are not exhaustive these examples of loses can begin to draw a 
picture of how expensive accidents are and how they can hurt the financial performance of an 
airport. One way to estimate on how much accidents or incidents are costing an airport is to 
reviewing accident and incident reports. The next step is to acquire audit reports from the 
airport’s insurance provider regarding the total cost of each accident claim or incident.   
It may become apparent that even a few small claims ranging from a few dollars can add 
up over time and this is adversary to preserving the bottom-line. Using proactive risk mitigation 
strategies can help airports achieve maximum financial performance through preventing losses 
that can cost the airport significant money over time. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MODERN THEORIES OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION 
Accident causation often focuses on the active failures at the operational level that was a 
breach of the safety mechanisms. Active failures are the action or lack of action such as human 
error that has an immediate consequence. One way to think about active failures is actions by an 
employee or tenant of an airport that is unsafe and may cause a destructive outcome (IACO, 
2013).     
The Swiss-Cheese Model is a conceptual model designed by Dr. James Reason that 
provides a clear understanding of the interaction between organizational and managerial factors 
that lead to airport accidents or incidents (Reason, 1997, pp. 9-20). Reason (1997), describes that 
within an airport that there are numerous defenses to protect against human error or decisions 
that are made in the hierarchical chain.  
Even though these defenses typically prevent accidents from occurring, any breaches in 
the protective defenses can lead to a catastrophic accident. Dr. Reason contends that single-point 
failures are rarely the cause of accidents. Rather that breaches in safety defenses are the often the 
consequence of decision-making at the highest levels of the organization (Reason, 1990). 
Reason (1997) suggests that accidents occur due to a combination of active and latent 
conditions. Latent conditions are variables that are present in the aviation environment, are not 
perceived as harmful and are present for some time before an accident. The Chernobyl RBMK 
nuclear reactor disaster in 1986 is a prime example of how a combination of active and latent 
conditions can lead to a catastrophic event.  
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Figure 4. “Swiss Cheese Model” 
 
In the case of Chernobyl, a combination of events that lead to the disaster such as the 
deliberate modification of emergency protection equipment mixed with violations in operating 
procedures. The subsequent investigations of the Chernobyl catastrophe demonstrated that lack 
of safety culture is a common latent condition that is often not recognized until it is too late. The 
Swiss-Cheese model helps emphasize that it is important to identify and mitigate these latent 
conditions through out the entire airport system as part of the SMS process. 
Another perspective of how organizations and members deviate from a procedures and 
rules over time. The term practical drift is derived from research that Colonel Scott A. Snook 
conducted to determine the root cause of a deadly friendly-fire incident involving the two U.S 
Air Force F-15’s fighter jets and two U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, an incident 
where twenty-six servicemen lost their lives.  
According to Snook (2000), practical drift is a phenomenon that occurs in when members 
of an organization slowly begin to stop following rules and procedures over a period of time. The 
diagram demonstrates in the beginning of a system design such as SMS, the baseline 
performance and the operational performance are functional and in-sync (Snook, 2000).  
19 
 
 
               
 
Figure 5. Practical Drift Model 
 
 Gradually, the operational performance (actual behavior by members of the organization) 
deviates from the baseline performance (standard of behavior by the members of the 
organization) and due to failures in the system such as technology, training and regulations an 
aircraft accident is more likely to happen. When rule abiding decreases over time and is not 
corrected by leadership, this is called practical drift. In the analysis of the friendly-fire incident, 
Col. Snook (2000) identifies that there were three major parties involved in this fatal accident. 
 The UH-60 Blackhawk unit had been flying operations together for approximately three 
years (Snook, 2000). The Air Force F-15 Eagle team had been experienced flying together for 
approximately the same time (Snook, 2000). Additionally, there was a Boeing E-3 Sentry 
Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft (AWAC) that was responsible for controlling the 
airspace and experienced supervising live-fire missions with joint-operations aircraft in that 
region (Snook, 2000).  
 Col. Snook determined in his investigation of the friendly-fire there were joint-operations 
being conducted in the Iraq with multiple branches of the military, however each branch was 
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operating within it’s own individual sphere of influence without regards for procedures (Snook, 
2000). Essentially, there were rules and procedures that were over a period of time were replaced 
by unofficial rules and procedures that resulted in each of the respective branches acting 
autonomous (Snook, 2000).  
 The habitual rule violation in both branches resulted in the Air Force F-15 crew failing to 
properly indentify the Army Blackhawk crew as a bona-fide target and the AWAC aircraft crew 
not indentifying the errors of the F-15 pilots and intervening as the liaison between the Army and 
the Air Force (Snook, 2000). After multiple investigations by the Department of Defense, 
Congressional Committees and independent U.S. government agencies over a two-year period, 
no single cause of the accident could be identified (Snook, 2000).  
 According to a report by the U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, there were over 130 
various mistakes involved in the friendly-fire incident – all stemming from practical drift in each 
organization (Snook, 2000). Practical drift often occurs without intention and is a naturally 
occurring process due to compliancy or adoption of non-official procedures by its members to 
increase efficiency in daily tasks (Snook, 2000). Administrators should be aware of practical 
drift and its effects on an organization’s safety. The SMS process can help identify incidents or 
trends in behavior that may lead to an accident occurring from natural practical drift. The 
promotion process of SMS is important in keeping everyone in the organization mindful of 
safety culture through continuous and purposeful learning opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
6 BEST PRACTICES FOR IMPLEMENTING SMS 
The goal of airport management should be to design a structured safety management 
system implementation plan that will provide guidance and updated information on events and 
things that are happening during the implementation phases. All of this information should be 
disseminated to all members of the organization on as need basis and readily available either in 
paper or online format. Keeping all members of the airport informed about changes that are 
occurring is a key strategy to acquire and maintain support for SMS. The SMS implementation 
chart highlights some of the basic activities occur during each phases of implementation.  
 
 
Figure 6. SMS Implementation Chart 
 
 Using a flow chart like the one above is practical and easy to use as a visual planning tool 
for an airport. Depending on the complexity of the organization and the safety management 
system, additional tasks can be added or omitted as needed. It is important to plan enough 
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adequate time to complete complex projects and to always consider problems or delays that may 
occur.  
Being flexible during the implementation process will help alleviate some of the growing 
pains of getting acquainted with a new SMS. It is important to remember that there will be issues 
and challenges that will arise, but this is just the process of starting a new way. Seizing upon 
those opportunities to learn from the mistakes and to be constantly vigilant of issues in the 
horizon will build the safety intelligence of the workforce and will grow a healthy safety culture.  
This chapter is designed it is to provide some strategies to help administrators when they 
are designing, planning and implementing SMS at their airports. This chapter has collected, 
analyzed and synthesized some of the lessons learned and strategies to aid with challenges 
evaluated in the SMS pilot studies. These suggested practices are derived from research 
conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Transportation Research Board 
(TRB), and the Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP), The International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and literature from aviation experts around the world. 
Top Management Support 
 One of the most important factors in implementing and planning is to have visible 
support from airport top management support. No matter how well developed the SMS plan may 
be if there is not support from top management – the system will not function. The airport 
manager and safety manager must understand that the responsibility of safety policy starts at the 
top. Demonstrating the value for SMS from the top management will help the indoctrination and 
safety training of employees.  
 Employees that recognize the value and benefits of SMS are more likely to buy-in and 
actively participate in activities such as hazard reporting and safety training. One strategy that 
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airport administrators can use is developing a department or assigning a safety manager that 
reports directly to the airport manager. Here the relationship between the safety manager and the 
accountable executive is strengthened and will improve communication regarding safety issues. 
Safety policies and decisions can then be made by the Accountable Executive with the guidance 
of the safety manager and then disseminated down to the rest of the organization.  
Conduct an Airport Safety Culture Survey 
Every plan has to start somewhere, but in order to properly identify each airport’s safety 
needs. Examining the airport the airport through the lens of safety management can help assess 
deficiencies or strengths in safety culture. Airport management can save a lot of time, money and 
resources by conducting a safety culture assessment of the airport during the initial planning 
stages of SMS. The culture survey should be viewed as tool in implementation of SMS and not 
as an audit report for the organization. An airport safety culture survey can also be part of the 
gap-analysis during the initial planning stages. The ACRP Synthesis 37 described one of the 
lessons learned by airport managers is that a gap-analysis helped with formulating a more 
accurate timeline for implementation and helped with the transition process (ACRP, 2012) 
Common trends of safety issues should be used as benchmarks and objectives to achieve 
and track using metrics. It is important that the safety culture survey is not designed as a method 
to discipline employees. Safety culture assessments can be conducted internally by the airport or 
externally by a credible third-party. Airport administrators will have to make the decision on 
how in-depth the survey will be based upon the amount of information needed for the SMS plan 
(ACRP, 2012). 
Performing a safety culture assessment of the airport will provide invaluable information 
to senior airport management about the status of safety culture. Performing annual cultural 
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assessments will provide data to track progress or deficiencies from the start of the 
implementation phases (IACO, 2013). Without proper information or data to determine safety 
culture there is no validation that the culture of safety is improving over time. It is important to 
remember that SMS is data-driven and the more reliable data available, the more informed 
airport management will be at making decisions about safety (Zohar, 2010). 
 Establish a Flexible SMS Implementation Schedule 
 Airport managers should be deliberate when designing the timeline for implementation. 
Timelines should be realistic and based upon the factors and resources readily available. At times 
during the implementation, schedules and deadlines should be re-evaluated to insure the final 
quality. Demonstrating strong management commitment will increase the probability of success 
and limit future problems when gaining support SMS (Stolzer et al, 2007).  
 Implementation timelines give both employees and supervisors a positive first perception 
of SMS and will increase their motivation to participate if they feel they are part of the planning 
from the beginning. Having a clear implementation timeline also provides personnel with 
adequate time to get acquainted with any new changes in rules or procedures that may come 
from the new SMS processes. In some cases, airport improvement projects can disrupt daily 
operations and this may require additional planning and coordination. The chart below is an 
example of a SMS implementation timeline for an airport. 
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Figure 7. SMS Implementation Project Schedule (Sample) 
 
 In this example, the SMS implementation process is broken down into five distinct 
phases identifying the key elements of SMS per the guidance of the FAA Advisory Circulars and 
IACO. SMS implementation planning charts should be designed so that they can be easily 
amended, if needed during any phase of the implementation (ACRP, 2012). The main goal of the 
accountable executive and the safety coordinator is keep the implementation on schedule as best 
as possible, however certain phases of implementation may take longer or less time than others 
depending on the airport (IACO, 2013).  
SMS Manual Development: Take Due Diligence 
 The airport SMS Manual should serve as the premier source for guidance on safety. Since 
specific information detailing the SMS framework and how the components of SMS integrate 
throughout the organization time should be invested in developing a quality SMS manual (Ayers, 
2009). The SMS manual should serve as the primary reference on airport safety and should be 
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designed to encompass all elements referencing safety (ACRP, 2012). Larger airports have more 
complex and layered organizational structures and may have many stakeholders. Having all of 
the appropriate stakeholders engaged in the SMS manual development will help ensure that the 
document is complete and properly reflects the organization (Ayers, 2009). The commitment to 
safety will clearly be articulated though the sections of the SMS manual and should serve as a 
resource for promotion and training employees about SMS (Ayers, 2009). SMS manuals should 
be customized specific for each airport and using a generic SMS plan from another airport 
(ACRP, 2012).  
 At smaller airports, fewer employees may mean that each employee or manager is taking 
on several different roles. Each of those roles and responsibilities are each important to the 
development and implementation of the SMS manual (ACRP, 2015). Both internal and external 
stakeholders should be provided with an opportunity to have early access and input in the SMS 
manual development. Smaller airports are commonly faced with smaller budgets and limited 
resources for projects. However, SMS is customizable and scalable to any size airport or 
organization and can be completed by airport administrators with minimal time to spare (ACRP, 
2015). 
 The most recent guidance on SMS manual content is provided in both the advisory 
circular (AC) 120-92B Safety Management Systems for Service Providers under Title 14 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) mandates that part 121 air carriers that are now required 
to implement Safety Management Systems (SMS) based on 14 CFR part 5 (FAA, 2015). 
Although there is no specific rule by the FAA mandating that airports have an SMS plan, AC 
120-92B can serve as the most recent document providing guidance on SMS implementation. 
 The new AC 120-92B is compliant with SMS Standards of the International Civil 
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Aviation Organization (ICAO), as published in ICAO Annex 19 for operations covered under 
Annex 6 Part I (FAA, 2015). These resources should be referenced for guidance when drafting or 
revising a SMS manual. 
Every Component of SMS is Critical 
 When evaluating safety management systems, it is natural to gravitate towards the Safety 
Risk Management (SRM) component of SMS. Although, SRM is at the heart of SMS, it is 
important to remember that each component of SMS interacts and influences with one another in 
a continuous process (ACRP, 2015). A quality safety management system places emphasis on all 
of the components of the SMS process equally. Being flexible and adaptive to the changes in the 
internal and external environment of the airport will insure that the SMS evolves and is a living 
document.  
 For an example, a safety policy outlined in the SMS manual will serve as the precedence 
for how SMS is to be implemented and followed by all airport employees. However, having 
safety policies are worthless if employees are not aware of them or do not understand them. 
Thus, the promotion component of SMS is the method is which employees are trained about 
safety policies. Having regular safety training opportunities will help foster awareness about 
SMS and will help promote SMS throughout the airport. 
 Important operational and analysis components of SMS are found in the safety risk 
management and safety assurance processes of SMS. Understanding how SRM and SA are 
relational can help strengthen the validity of the analysis on safety hazards and risk mitigation. 
Being able to track the progress of SMS will help provide data that will help provide justification 
for further investment or expansion of SMS.  
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Figure 8. SRM and SRA Analysis Flow Chart 
 
 During the safety assurance phase, it is recommended that airports develop and 
implement a method for monitoring safety performance (ACRP, 2012). Airport management 
should annually evaluate the continued effectiveness of implemented risk mitigation strategies 
under SRM and determine areas of weakness (ACRP, 2012). Accountable executives should 
systematically provide confidence that the airport is meeting or exceeding its safety objectives 
through continuous improvement (IACO, 2013). Safety assurance verifies the effectiveness of 
the mitigations established under SRM and thus both processes are interdependent (ACRP, 
2012).  
Safety Risk Management – 5 Step Process 
 For many airport administrators safety risk management may be a new concept and can 
be confusing if not formally exposed to the process. This section is designed to provide the 
accountable executive, safety coordinator or safety committee with a simple breakdown of the 
SRM process and how to conduct a basic safety risk assessment. 
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 The first step in the SRM process is to (1) Describe the System. The system can be 
anything ranging from the employees, departments, or specific work duties that are interacting in 
the same environment that may be the catalyst for hazards. For an example, a new construction 
project in a terminal may be the system being examined for hazards and risks. The system can be 
described as anything within the sphere of influence of the airport or the scope of daily 
operations.  
 Having an interactive roundtable with various stakeholders that can provide data and 
information in a quick and holistic manner can help strengthen the analysis conducting during 
the SRM and SA processes. Although, two airport departments may work in the same part of the 
airport system, each department administrator may hold varying perspectives of that same 
system.  
 The next step and one of the most crucial activities of the SRM process is (2) Hazard 
Identification. Airport administrators should be aware that this is the most complicated and time-
consuming part of the SRM component.  Stakeholders must analyze the system they are 
evaluating for any hazards that could potentially lead to an accident.  
 One common mistake that occurs during the hazard identification process is the common 
tendency for airport stakeholders to confuse hazards with their consequence or outcome rather 
than the hazard itself. For an example, an airport may have a problem with proper runway 
marking and one stakeholder proposes that the hazard is an aircraft collision on the runway. In 
actuality, the hazard is the poor runway markings and one potential consequence is an aircraft 
collision on the runway. Identifying the consequence and severity of the outcome in the next step 
of SRM. One method for identifying hazards is to draw broad categories on a dry-erase board 
and then reach consensus on each hazard using a majority vote. In some cases, multiple hazards 
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may require the same mitigation strategy. Another common mistake during this process is to 
automatically attempt to provide a mitigation control while at the same time identifying the 
hazard. Compartmentalize each part of the SRM process and have the accountable executive 
facilitate the meeting with some time parameters so that the process does not become drawn-out 
or stagnated.  
 The third step in the SRM process is to (3) Analyze the Risks.  During this step 
stakeholders need to determine the potential outcome of the hazards, the severity of the outcome 
and the likelihood an incident would occur (ACRP, 2015). It is important to remember that 
hazards and risks are two different concepts. A hazard can present a risk to the airport, whereas 
risk is the likelihood or probability that an accident will occur with an outcome (IACO, 2013). 
As recommended in the second step of SRM, drawing categories of hazards will help cluster 
similar hazards along with the severity, likelihood and outcome analyses in this process. Again, 
compromise will be paramount during this evolution. 
 The fourth step of SRM is to (4) Assess the Risks. In this step, airport stakeholders need 
to conduct analysis of the likelihood and severity of the risk compared to what the acceptable 
level of risk. Below is an example of the standard FAA ‘5x5’ risk matrix.  Various risk matrices 
or instruments can be designed or modified at an administrators’ discretion. The definitions of 
risk levels are detailed in the FAA Order 5200.11 (FAA, 2010).  
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Figure 9. 
 There are three categories of risk detailed in Order 5200.11 – Low Risk, Medium Risk 
and High Risk. High Risk is considered unacceptable if a hazard is ranging from major to 
catastrophic in severity or that the likelihood of an accident is frequent or probable. Therefore, 
airport stakeholders need to devise methods to mitigate the hazard and to bring down the level of 
risk. If the level of risk cannot be decreased to an acceptable level using mitigation strategies - 
the project or activity should be suspended or terminated until the risk can be deemed acceptable. 
 Medium Risk is a threshold that is considered acceptable by the FAA standards. It can be 
considered the minimum requirements of acceptable risk, however the project or activity can 
continue as long as risk level is not increased. Proper methods for tracking hazards and risks 
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should be proven using reliable data. The final level of risk is Low Risk, this level is acceptable 
and these types of hazards do not require significant tracking or monitoring. All hazards and 
risks should be documented however there should be no issues in daily operations.  
 After all hazards have been properly identified along with their respective risk factors the 
final step of SRM is mitigation. In this phase, the Accountable Executive along with the safety 
coordinator will typically have the final authority on what mitigation strategies or resources are 
used to decrease the risk of an airport. These actions range from accepting the risk if the risk is 
determined to be minimal or there are no further options for decreasing the risk to avoiding or 
suspending an activity or operation based upon hazardous conditions. Airport decision-makers 
must use their best judgment using the best information available while brainstorming and 
deploying mitigation strategies. 
 Further details regarding safety risk management and performing safety risk assessments 
can be referenced in the new ACRP Report 131 and the FAA Airport Circular 120-92B released 
this year. The 2013 IACO Safety Management Manual provides a comprehensive overview of 
airport safety management systems and provides supplemental documents to help airport and 
safety managers implement SMS. Based upon the new FAA regulation that mandates Aviation 
Service Providers implement some form of a safety management system, Part 139 airports may 
be subject to similar regulation in the near future.  
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CONCLUSION 
 SMS has become a practical and valuable resource for airports and other high-risk 
industries to implement as part of their business strategic plan. Proper risk management tactics 
can help an airport preserve and maximize resources and minimize the amount of financial losses 
over time due a decrease in accidents. Accidents due to negligence can be costly directly and 
indirectly. The reputation of the airport and its’ employees can be severely damaged by an 
accident and this can hurt the airport as well as third-party businesses.  
 Airport administrators must demonstrate a strong commitment to safety through their 
actions and how they implement safety policy. A strong organizational safety culture is 
synonymous with members demonstrating their commitment safety by actions in the workplace. 
Airports that can establish an environment that supports confidential hazard reporting should 
evaluate their organizations total safety performance improve over time. An airport’s SMS 
manual should serve as the document for all policies and information pertaining to airport safety. 
 A SMS plan can be scalable to any size airport. A SMS plan does not have to be costly 
and is a plan that is developed and implemented over time. Justification for investing money 
should be based upon doing the right thing to make the airport as safety for everyone as possible.  
  In January 2015, the FAA passed federal rules requiring commercial airlines to have a 
safety management system as part of their operating requirements. As an effort to increase safety 
in the aerospace industry airports may be subject to similar rules as commercial airlines are by 
the FAA in the near future. Airports that are progressive in designing their safety management 
systems prior to FAA rulemaking may be at an advantage in building a stronger safety culture.  
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